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Finleythewombat
Finleythewombat
3/20/2019 10:08:27 AM
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Newbie
You can't train around bad design
Three thoughts:

1) Commercial flight procedures need a complete re-think. A pilot isn't necessarily going to have encyclopedic knowledge of these increasingly-complex aircraft, so he needs access to something like the Mission Control team associated with spaceflight, and they in turn need access to his aircraft telemetry. From the preliminary reports, it seems the accident was an "SCE to aux" scenario (read about that here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Aaron) that might have been averted if the pilot had had instant access to expert technical support.  

2) Aircraft designers seem to be ignoring the most basic rules of design. If you're going to implement redundant systems, then you need THREE (in this case three angle-of-attack sensors). Two is pointless, because in the event of failure, you don't know which one is malfunctioning. Related to that, they're not asking: what's the worst that can happen if this fails? 

3) The system under discussion strikes me as pointless. Aircraft have been fitted with stall warning systems since forever. Why close the loop? Give the pilot the warning, and let him make the decision.

 

 

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DaveR1234
DaveR1234
3/18/2019 1:54:04 PM
User Rank
Newbie
Good summary
This is the best article I've read on the subject.  I think 99% of the fault lies with Boeing.  They took away the usual method of disabling the automated stabilizer, pulling on the stick, for no good reason.  1% for the pilot for not remembering the new method.

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UD-00001
UD-00001
3/18/2019 12:50:20 PM
User Rank
Newbie
Not unseen before
These crashes remind me of the Lufthansa Flight 2904 crash at Warsaw (1993)
( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lufthansa_Flight_2904 ) plus some other crashes that could be backtracked to automated systems with less-than-optimum requirements specifications.

We'll all be able to see the outcome of the recent crashes...

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steve.taranovich
steve.taranovich
3/16/2019 12:54:25 PM
User Rank
Blogger
This seems to be a Boeing UK site
Check out this link http://www.b737.org.uk/mcas.htm

It looks like a valid site. Please let me know what you think?

 

To me, I still say that more intensive training is needed on this kind of aircraft and lots of simulator time. And where is the big, glaring "ON/OFF" switch to activate manual control? Although, you should not need that with adequate training before a pilot actually flies this aircraft

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Bob_D
Bob_D
3/14/2019 10:26:01 AM
User Rank
Newbie
Excellent
Great article Steve with great insight. Training, training, training!

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